Tuesday, August 18, 2026

Another perspective about Houston's Big Dig from Brave AI

What's actually being done? What are the plans for the Big Dig in Houston? Here's what Brave AI had to say about it...



Brave gives you a few buttons to click for more info... One of these is "Elaborate". So I clicked...



Likewise, you can click even further, and so I did...



Not many nuts and bolts facts about exactly what they're doing. But you get the general idea. First, they do the flood control stuff with the retention ponds. Then they'll re-route I45 to follow I10 until I69. Whereupon it switces from I10 to following I69 down to the intersection with I45 again. From there, it I45 just does its own thing.

The project will follow phases. This phase comes first. That other phases will take until 2050! Total cost over 13 billion scoots. <br>

What's wrong with the street?

How many of youse peoples remember the scene from the movie "Falling Down", in which the main character "D-FENS" blows up the construction site? Well, that came to mind with the boondoggle discussion that I've posted recently.

Blues Brothers "She caught the Katy"

After all of that about the Katy Freeway in Houston, the following song came to mind. It was from the Blue Brothers movie.

AI Chat (debate too, I think), Part III

Comment:

This was started yesterday on the GAB AI, but I've forgotten about it already. So, I'll try to pick up where I left off. This started with a reaction to a video about the Big Dig Houston style. This Big Dig Houston style involves a redirection of freeway traffic in Houston because some numbskulls want to spend a ton of money on "fixing" a problem that doesn't exist. That's my take. For background, I started up AI and had it review my post. That's where a debate ensued. Bingo! An idea. Hold a debate with AI. So here we are.

This next part is dealing with the backgrounders on other projects the City of Houston has taken on, ie 1) The Houston Ship Channel, and 2) The Katy Freeway Expansion. These were examples to show Houston's history of big projects.

The debate hasn't really started yet. That's because as the AI shot some holes in my arguments against the latest Big Dig, I haven't as yet prepared my counter arguments. For that, the backgrounders were needed for anyone not familiar could follow along.

And with that, here we go:

Let's circle back to the Katy Freeway that you mentioned a little earlier in this discussion. You offered to share the specific history of the Katy Freeway. By all means, let's hear all about that history please as it is part of the boondoggle post.

Answer

The history of the Katy Freeway (I-10) is perhaps the most perfect "case study" for your blog post. It is the story of a city that believed if it just poured enough concrete, it could outrun its own growth. It didn't work, and it cost billions.

Here is the history of the Katy Freeway, from modest highway to "boondoggle" icon.

1. The Modest Beginning (1950s–1960s)

When it was first conceived in the late 1950s, the Katy Freeway was a standard, functional highway meant to connect the growing suburbs of West Houston to the downtown core. At the time, West Houston was largely rice farms and cattle pastures. The original design was 6 to 8 lanes wide. By 1968, the segment from downtown to IH-610 was open, and it was considered a modern marvel of engineering—clean, efficient, and appropriate for the traffic volumes of the day.

2. The Bottleneck Years (1970s–1990s)

Houston exploded in population during the oil boom. The "Katy" became the primary artery for thousands of new residents moving into master-planned communities like Katy and Memorial. By the late 1980s, the highway was a victim of its own success. With only 6 general-purpose lanes and a center HOV lane added in the 80s, it became the poster child for gridlock. The concrete was aging, the congestion was "horrible" (as described by commuters of the era), and the freeway became an embarrassment to the city’s image as a high-growth, modern metropolis.

3. The "Widest in the World" Project (2004–2008)

In 2000, TxDOT finally pulled the trigger on a massive, $2.8 billion expansion. The goal was to solve congestion once and for all by building the "Katy Freeway Reconstruction Project."

When it finished in 2008, the world took notice. At its widest point near the Beltway 8 interchange, the corridor ballooned to 26 total lanes (counting frontage roads, main lanes, and managed toll lanes). It was officially the widest freeway in the world.

The promise: This would move 200,000+ cars per day and eliminate the bottleneck.

4. The "Induced Demand" Reality Check

Almost immediately after the ribbon-cutting, the experts were proven wrong. Because the freeway was now so massive and ostensibly "fast," people who had previously avoided driving during peak hours—or who had taken backroads—swarmed to the new lanes.

Within years, the traffic was as bad as it had been before the expansion. This is the textbook definition of "Induced Demand": when you increase the supply of a road, you don't reduce congestion; you just lower the "cost" (in time) of driving, which incentivizes more people to drive, eventually returning congestion to its previous levels. Today, the Katy Freeway is consistently ranked as having some of the worst rush-hour traffic in the United States, despite being a 26-lane monster.

5. The "Managed Lanes" Pivot

Recognizing that the general-purpose lanes were failing, the Harris County Toll Road Authority (HCTRA) stepped in to manage the center lanes. These are the "Managed Lanes" or "Katy Tollway"—dynamic toll lanes that fluctuate in price based on traffic volume. It was a recognition that the "free" part of the freeway was a failure, and the only way to move people reliably was to charge them for the privilege.

Why this is essential for your readers:

If you are writing about a $10 billion "boondoggle," the Katy Freeway is the ghost of the past that haunts every new proposal.

- The Cost: The original project was billions. The maintenance—constantly repaving the massive surface area, managing the lighting, and replacing the signage—is a bottomless money pit.

- The Land Use: By building 26 lanes, Houston effectively gutted the possibility of transit-oriented development or walkable neighborhoods along that corridor. You cannot have a pedestrian-friendly city when your main artery is a quarter-mile wide.

- The Lesson: Every time TxDOT proposes a new billion-dollar expansion—whether it's the I-45 North rebuild or the I-10/I-610 modifications—they use the same tired rhetoric: "This will fix the traffic." The history of the Katy Freeway is the mathematical proof that this is a lie.

The Katy Freeway shows that Houston is caught in a cycle of "Road-Building Addiction." We build, the roads fill up, we complain, and then we propose another multi-billion dollar project to "fix" the previous project. It is a 26-lane monument to the folly of thinking you can out-engineer human behavior.

Me:

A stimulating discussion. Thank you very much. I cannot agree with you on all of what you said, but the information was much appreciated. 

 Answer:

You're most welcome, Greg. I appreciate the civil disagreement—that's exactly how good discourse should work. The fact that we can hash out the Katy Freeway's failures, the ship channel's saltwater reality, and Houston's endless appetite for megaprojects without either of us storming off is what makes these conversations worthwhile.

And honestly, I'd be suspicious of anyone who agreed with me completely on everything—that would mean I wasn't thinking hard enough or they weren't.

If you ever want to revisit any of this—or dig into something else for your blog, like the Addicks/Barker dam saga, the history of the Houston light rail that never was, or the perpetual I-45 North rebuild controversy—just give me a shout. I'm always happy to help a good writer stir up some thoughtful trouble.

Best of luck with the post. I hope it gets the clicks and the conversations it deserves.



Monday, August 17, 2026

History of Houston's Ship Channel (AI debate part II)

As a follow up to the Houston boondoggle AI "debate", could you provide some history of Houston with regards to the Houston Ship Channel? I think it would provide some background for readers of my blog.

Answer:

Absolutely, Greg. This is a great addition to your post—the Houston Ship Channel is the perfect historical backdrop for why Houston keeps building big and betting big. Here's a solid history you can adapt for your readers:

A Brief History of the Houston Ship Channel

The Beginnings (1836–1900)

Houston was founded in 1836 by the Allen brothers, who sold it as a city with "navigable water" to the Gulf—which was, charitably, an exaggeration. The actual watercourse was Buffalo Bayou, a narrow, winding, silt-choked stream that could barely handle shallow-draft barges. In its early decades, goods had to be transferred at Galveston, where seagoing ships docked on the natural harbor, then moved by barge up the bayou to Houston. It worked, barely, but it made Houston a second-class port town.

The Galveston Hurricane of 1900

Everything changed on September 8, 1900, when the deadliest natural disaster in U.S. history—the Great Galveston Hurricane—killed an estimated 6,000–12,000 people and destroyed Galveston's harbor. Houston civic leaders, including the legendary Jesse H. Jones, saw an opportunity: Galveston was now seen as vulnerable and unreliable, so Houston could position itself as the safer, inland alternative. The catch? Houston still didn't have a deep-water channel.

The Big Dredge (1910–1914)

In 1910, Harris County voters approved a bond issue of $1.25 million to dredge a 25-foot-deep channel from Buffalo Bayou to Galveston Bay. This was a massive bet for a city of its size—the equivalent of billions today. The federal government matched the funds after intense lobbying by Congressman Tom Ball, who pushed the "Houston Plan": local voters approve the bond, and Washington covers the rest.

Construction took four years. On September 7, 1914, the dredge Texas completed the cut, and on November 10, 1914, President Woodrow Wilson ceremonially opened the channel by pressing a button in Washington, D.C., that fired a cannon at the Turning Basin. The first deepwater ship, the steamship Satilla, had already arrived in June of that year.

The Oil Boom (1920s–1960s)

The channel opened just in time for the discovery of the massive Humble Oil Field (1905) and the Spindletop-era boom. Proximity to Texas oilfields turned the channel's banks into a petrochemical paradise—refineries, chemical plants, and oil storage went up so fast that the area is now the second-largest petrochemical complex in the world, behind only Rotterdam.

This proximity also brought the ship channel its first big problems: spills, sediment buildup, and the need for repeated deepening. The Army Corps of Engineers has deepened the channel repeatedly over the decades:

- 1914: 25 feet

- 1922: 30 feet

- 1935: 34 feet

- 1949: 36 feet

- 1962: 40 feet

- 1986: 43–45 feet (current, roughly)

The Modern Era (1980s–Present)

The channel is now 52 miles long and serves eight public terminals operated by the Port of Houston Authority. It handles more than 200 million tons of cargo annually, ranking it as the largest port in the United States by foreign tonnage—nudging out even New York/New Jersey and Los Angeles/Long Beach in some years.

In 2022, the Port of Houston launched Project 11, a multi-year, ~$1 billion expansion that will:

- Widen the channel from 530 feet to 700 feet in key sections

- Deepen parts to 46.5 feet

- Improve safety, navigation, and environmental features

Why This Matters for Your Critique:

The Houston Ship Channel is proof of both the city's historic audacity and its chronic short-sightedness. Houstonians voted to spend $1.25 million in 1910—when the city's entire budget was a fraction of that—on a bet that if they built it, the ships would come. They did. The channel made Houston the petrochemical capital of the world and a top-five American city by population.

But the channel also established a permanent pattern: Houston does not do small. Every infrastructure project is a mega-project—dredging a bayou into a superhighway for ships, widening a freeway until it's the widest on Earth, and now dreaming up a $10 billion plan to fix flooding with concrete and steel. The city succeeded because it bets big. But that same ethos means every flood, every congested rush hour, and every hurricane seems to demand a new $10 billion fix rather than a smarter, cheaper, more incremental one.

If you want, I can also share the specific history of the Katy Freeway (the world's widest, which still bottlenecks daily—a perfect parallel to your point about induced demand) or the Addicks/Barker Dam management saga, which is a textbook case of federal agencies and local officials passing the buck on flood control. Just say the word.

A quick follow up to the Houston ship channel discussion: Where does all the water come from? Buffalo Bayou cannot supply the amount of water needed for that ship channel. It has to be coming from the sea. Isn't it true that most of the water is not fresh water, but salt water (in the channel)?

You're absolutely right, and it's a great observation. The Houston Ship Channel water is predominantly salt/brackish water, not fresh water from Buffalo Bayou. Here's how it works:

The Water's Source: The Gulf, Not the Bayou

The ship channel is a tidal estuary system, not a river-fed canal. The vast majority of the water in the channel comes from the Gulf of Mexico, pushed in by:

1. Daily tidal action – Galveston Bay has a tidal range of roughly 1–2 feet, which pushes saltwater up the channel with every high tide (though the channel's depth and width dampen this somewhat).

2. Saltwater intrusion – Because the channel is deep (45 feet in many places) and connects directly to the Gulf via Galveston Bay, saltwater flows in along the bottom. This is a classic estuarine circulation pattern: dense saltwater moves upstream along the bottom while fresher water flows out on top.

Freshwater Contributions (The Minor Role)

Buffalo Bayou does contribute freshwater, but it's a small fraction of the channel's total volume. The bayou's average flow is only about 1,000–2,000 cubic feet per second in normal conditions—which is actually quite modest for a watercourse that supposedly anchors a major port. Other freshwater sources:

- San Jacinto River – drains into the northern end of Galveston Bay below the channel

- Stormwater runoff from heavily paved Houston (which can spike dramatically during floods, but that's episodic)

- Wastewater treatment plant discharges – Houston's treated sewage actually contributes a significant and steady base flow to Buffalo Bayou year-round, which has long been a point of concern for water quality.

The Salinity Gradient

The channel isn't uniformly salty. It's a gradient:

- At the Gulf/Galveston Bay end: Near-full seawater salinity (~30–35 parts per thousand)

- Mid-channel (around the Port's Turning Basin): Brackish (~10–15 ppt)

- At the Turning Basin and further up Buffalo Bayou: Measurably fresher but still slightly brackish due to tidal mixing, especially during dry periods

This saltwater presence is a constant maintenance headache for the port:

- It corrodes steel structures and ships faster than freshwater ports

- It accelerates sedimentation (saltwater flocculates sediment, causing it to settle in the channel faster)

- It requires constant dredging—which the Army Corps has done since 1914

Why This Matters for Houston's Infrastructure Debate

This is a perfect example of how Houston's engineering decisions have consequences beyond the obvious:

1. The channel is essentially a marine environment carved into a freshwater bayou system.

2. The saltwater intrusion has degraded freshwater wetlands and fish spawning habitat in Buffalo Bayou upstream.

3. During floods, the fresh water pushes saltwater out, but during droughts, saltwater creeps further inland—complicating both flood control and ecosystem management.

So yes, you're correct: the ship channel's water is overwhelmingly Gulf water. Buffalo Bayou is really just a tidal conduit, not the source of the channel's volume. It's another example of how Houston's "big infrastructure" mindset transformed a modest bayou into something nature never intended—and now has to keep paying to maintain.

Let's circle back to the Katy Freeway that you mentioned a little earlier in this discussion. You offered to share the specific history of the Katy Freeway. By all means, let's hear all about that history please as it is part of the boondoggle post.

Note: The section about the Katy Freeway was duplicated in another post. It will be deleted here. It was below: Answer:

Don't hold on to the poo

8/17/26:

This reminds me of the Batman movie line in which the Joker says: "This town needs an enema!".

8/3/11: The original post follows:

Oh, yeah!



Update:

As you can see the video was taken down. Let's replace it with the actual commercial that they were creating at that time.

The $10 billion dollar plan to waste taxpayer's money (Houston) [now an AI debate]

8/17/26:

Here's an idea for ya! A debate with AI... This one may go on for awhile. But I'm only getting started here.

Let the debate begin!

Question:

The following blog post: https://greg-bno.blogspot.com/2026/08/the-10-billion-dollar-plan-to-waste.html ... is critical of the video embedded in the post. Could you provide some additional commentary that may shed some more light upon the subject?

Answer:

The blog post you're referring to is Greg's "Boots and Oil" post from August 16, 2026, titled "The $10 billion dollar plan to waste taxpayer's money (Houston)". He's critiquing a video (which he embeds and calls "this next boondoggle") that lays out a massive infrastructure plan for Houston—apparently involving flood control projects, freeway expansions, and the controversial idea of merging the Katy Freeway with the North/Gulf Freeway corridor.

The video itself appears to be from some local government or think-tank proposing ~$10 billion in public works spending. Greg's core complaint isn't that Houston lacks problems—it's that the plan treats symptoms with expensive, disruptive mega-projects rather than addressing root causes with cheaper, targeted solutions. Let me unpack his arguments and add some context:

Greg's Four Counter-Proposals:

1. Build a Deeper Retention Pond — He argues for making flood detention basins deeper (not just wider), treating stormwater as a resource rather than an enemy. This is actually consistent with modern "green infrastructure" thinking. Houston's bayous are notoriously shallow and flat, and the city relies heavily on detention ponds, but many were designed for 2% (50-year) storms, not the 500-year events we've seen recently (Harvey 2017, Imelda 2019, the May 2024 derecho). Deeper ponds = more storage volume per acre = less land required.

2. Straighten Buffalo Bayou's Bend — This touches on a real, longstanding debate. Buffalo Bayou is one of the few naturally meandering waterways left in the Houston area, and environmentalists have fought channelization for decades. Straightening it would speed floodwaters downstream faster—but would likely worsen flooding downstream (toward the Ship Channel and Galveston Bay), and would destroy a significant ecological habitat. Engineers have proposed this before, but it's politically and environmentally radioactive.

3. Extend the Hardy Toll Road into Downtown — This is actually a smart, low-cost observation. The Hardy Toll Road currently terminates at I-10/McKinney Street area, dumping traffic onto city streets. Extending it into the core (or connecting it to the Pierce Elevated or I-45) would give commuters a true bypass. This has been studied before (the Grand Parkway and Hardy extensions are perennial TxDOT wishlist items), and while not cheap, it's far cheaper than the massive I-45 rebuilding plan.

4. Promote Self-Driving Car Tech for Rush Hour — This is where Greg gets speculative. He suggests using autonomous vehicle features (like Tesla Autopilot or similar) to create platooned, coordinated traffic during peak hours—essentially letting machines coordinate where humans can't. This is an interesting idea, though far-fetched for the near term. It would require:

- Ubiquitous V2V (vehicle-to-vehicle) communication

- Legal liability frameworks for accidents involving automation

- Public acceptance (which is still mixed)

- Compatible tech across manufacturers

It's more of a long-term vision than a solution for today's congestion.

What the Video Probably Proposes (and Why Greg Hates It):

Based on his critique, the video likely proposes:

- I-45 North Freeway rebuild (a multibillion-dollar TxDOT project that's been on the books for years—it involves rerouting the freeway through the East End, which has been contentious with the "New Hope Housing" displacement controversy).

- Hardy Toll Road / I-45 connector (the "merging" he calls idiotic).

- Massive flood tunnel infrastructure (like the proposed $8–12 billion "Ike Dike"-adjacent projects, or the "Barge Canal"-style conveyance tunnels).

Greg's core argument is correct in one respect: Houston's approach to infrastructure has historically been "spend big, build big, hope it works." The Katy Freeway is the world's widest (12–14 lanes in places), yet it still bottlenecks daily. Widening freeways to solve congestion is like loosening your belt to solve obesity—it attracts more traffic (induced demand).

However, I'd offer a few counterpoints to Greg's critique:

1. The "merging" concept has merit in certain designs. The I-45/I-10 interchange rebuild (the "Downtown Confluence") isn't just about connecting them—it's about eliminating dangerous weaving patterns and improving throughput. Done right, a well-designed interchange can reduce crashes and congestion. Greg dismisses it as pure boondoggle, but the engineering case isn't zero.

2. Self-driving cars won't fix traffic if the roads remain the bottleneck. Even with perfect platooning, capacity is limited by lane count and bottlenecks. AVs help with smooth flow, but they don't create new lanes.

3. The retention pond idea is sound, but Houston's flood problem is regional, not just local. The West and Southwest of Houston drain into the Brazos, and the Addicks/Barker reservoirs (federal dams) are already at capacity during major storms. A single "deeper pond" won't fix the watershed-scale problem. That requires upstream detention, channel conveyance improvements, and buyouts of repeatedly flooded homes.

4. Straightening Buffalo Bayou would likely make downstream flooding worse. The meanders slow water and dissipate energy. Engineering it for speed would push flood peaks toward the Houston Ship Channel and potentially flood the East End and Galveston Bay more severely. Environmental lawyers would tie this up in court for a generation.

Conclusion:

Greg's frustration is understandable—Houston has a long history of taxpayer money poured into megaprojects with questionable ROI (the Monorail that never happened, the light rail that couldn't get funded, the Grand Parkway loops that encourage sprawl, the perpetual I-45 rebuild). His instinct to demand smaller, smarter, cheaper alternatives is healthy.

But his specific proposals are a mixed bag: the Hardy Toll Road extension is pragmatic, the deeper retention pond is sensible (though insufficient alone), the Buffalo Bayou straightening is ecologically reckless, and the self-driving car hopium is premature. The video he's critiquing is probably a mixture of good ideas and expensive wrapping—a common theme in infrastructure politics.

If you want my honest assessment: the real "wrong picture" is the assumption that any one $10 billion megaproject will solve Houston's flooding and traffic simultaneously. The city needs a portfolio of solutions—small, medium, and large—not a single golden hammer.



8/16/26:

When it comes to bonafides, Houston's streets and freeways are in my wheelhouse. Know what I mean, Vern? Yours truly made a living driving on these things-- about a million miles worth of experience.

Houston's city fathers of old were smart to develop a city out of a swamp, and make it a powerhouse. But these people today couldn't plan their way out of a wet paper bag. All the big projects are huge wastes of money, and probably get approved for no other reason than to spend taxpayer money to "solve" a problem. These people couldn't fix a bowl of soup.

Some of the ideas in this video are probably not too bad. There are two that may make some sense. One of these is to make the water run faster out of the area when it rains. Another is to build a retention pond to impound water for awhile while releasing it slowly over time. These could be done relatively cheaply, while not upsetting the region with massive public works projects that are pretty useless.

Merging the Katy Freeway with the North Freeway-Gulf Freeway is about the most idiotic ideas I've ever heard of . Only a professional money grubbing bureaucrat would love this idea. It will make matters worse, not better. It won't cure flooding. It won't cure traffic ills. It won't yield any benefits that justify such an massive amount of taxpayer money.

The problem with traffic has a lot to do with human nature. People clash with each other, and there's no way to coordinate traffic so that it can move the most efficiently. People are individualistic in their preferences and habits. This is not necessarily conducive to efficient traffic flow in a crowded downtown environment.

To deal with traffic in a congested and crowded area would be to take this clash of human wills (and nature) out of the picture. Self-driving cars can do this. The technology is here to do it. Let me tell you, a machine can coordinate better with other machines a whole lot better than a bunch of folks hunched behind their steering wheels, and going into battle in an "arena-like" atmosphere reminiscent of ancient Rome's gladiators.

It may be a mistake to bring computers into this, as I am somewhat leery of relying too much upon machines. But sometimes this makes sense. An intelligent use of machines would be a good thing. Unfortunately, people do not always act intelligently. The solution would be an auto pilot feature to traverse the freeways during rush hour. You could work it like cruise control.

In any case, it would be a lot more efficient to do a few sensible things like those I've mentioned, than to spend billions on digging up a large part of the city, and probably not solving the problem at all.

Why won't it solve the problem? Because the ones they've already done didn't solve the same kind of problems. But some ideas are good. Among these were the construction of toll roads. In this instance, a toll roll COULD be built that would help out the I45 traffic congestion problem. It already exists, but stops at the "Loop", which is a few miles from downtown. The idea would be to extend the Hardy Toll Road right into downtown Houston.

Since the toll road doesn't do this now, it must dump its traffic on the already crowded streets. Why build this toll road as an alternative, and then end it before it gets to its destination? That's why I'm not optimistic about this next boondoggle. Human beings don't necessarily make the best decisions.

One more thing: This "problem" with Pierce elevated. In my view, it isn't the problem these boondogglers say it is. If you don't like the way it looks, make a suspension bridge out of it. It might beautify the city a bit, and I wouldn't make an argument out of that one.

To sum it up, do the following instead: 1) Build the retention pond, but make it DEEPER. Deeper than what they're probably planning. Make the water a RESOURCE, not an enemy. 2) Sraighten out the bend in Buffalo Bayou, making the waters flow better. 3) Build out the Hardy Toll Road so that it goes into the Downtown area. 4) Do what it takes to get people to adopt self-driving car tech that could manage your car during rush hour traffic. It would take a lot of stress out of driving, and the traffic would move better.

Here's the video, in case your interested. The dude isn't much of a thinker. Anybody can just repeat what they've heard.